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Utopia in a liberal world facing crisis. Analysis  
of the new «grammars of change»
La utopía en un mundo liberal enfrentado a la crisis. Análisis 
de las nuevas «gramáticas del cambio»
n i c o l a s m a r q u i s
u n i v e r s i t é s a i n t-l o u i s  –  b r u x e l l e s
AbstrAct: The decline of utopia in some western intellectual environments has 
become an object of interest for scientists and essayists in these last few years. 
Yet, little has been done to analyze the common sense production of utopias or 
dystopias. This article will make use of the results of a statistical survey (n=2774) 
to describe what can be called, in reference to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, «the 
grammars of change», i.e., a more or less shared representation of «what is wrong» 
with society, but also of the real or illusionary possibilities to transform society. 
The article focuses on a striking line of tension. While some people still value 
political action as the bearer of a possible change, most interviewees consider it 
obsolete and unreliable. These people, who are so skeptical about politics, tend 
on the contrary to (over)invest in the idea that the power of change lies within the 
individual, in everybody’s changing their own values and attitudes.
Keywords: sociology of individualism, grammars of change, self-help, utopia, 
faith in politics, liberal societies.
resumen: El declive de las utopías entre ciertos sectores intelectuales occiden-
tales se ha convertido en objeto de interés científico y ensayístico en los últimos 
años, a pesar de lo cual no se han realizado suficientes análisis sobre la produc-
ción del sentido común en relación a las utopías y distopías. El presente artículo 
utiliza los resultados de una encuesta estadística (n=2774) para describir lo que 
podrían denominarse, siguiendo la filosofía de Wittgenstein, las «gramáticas del 
cambio», es decir, la representación, en mayor o menor medida, común de «lo 
que está mal» en la sociedad, aunque también de las posibilidades reales o iluso-
rias de transformación de la misma. El artículo se centra en una notable línea de 
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tensión: mientras que algunas personas todavía valoran la acción política como 
motor posible de cambio, la mayoría de los entrevistados la consideran obsoleta y 
poco fiable. Estos últimos, escépticos con la política, tienden, por el contrario, a 
(sobre)valorar la idea de que el poder de cambio reside en los individuos, en que 
cada uno cambie sus propios valores y comportamientos.
Palabras clave: sociología del individualismo, gramáticas del cambio, autoayuda, 
utopía, confianza en la política, sociedades liberales.
1.  Introduction: On the merits of a sociological view of lay usage  
of the discourse about «the crisis»
Asserting that the world is in crisis will produce very little disagreement 
today. The language of crisis has indeed permeated most aspects of our lives. 
It carries with it representations of the worlds, upwellings of our imaginations 
as to what drags the world into a crisis, but also statements about possible ways 
of exiting the crisis.
What is a crisis? As of what moment can one speak of a «state of crisis»? 
Unlike what a positivistic perspective might lead one to believe, there are no 
objective criteria or cut-offs for defining the moment that one enters a crisis. 
This is particularly by true of economic crises. As Frederic Lordon (2009, 
2011) shows, the economic sciences themselves have great difficulty thinking 
through what a crisis is. This makes it one of the most poorly constructed 
concepts in existence. From a social science perspective, studying a «crisis» is 
thus inseparable from studying the way the crisis fits into the layperson’s social 
representations. In other words, we must ask, in the manner of the pragmatist 
philosopher William James, what difference the presence of this notion in our 
representations and social affects makes in the way we live.
What does this concern about the «crisis» span when it comes not from 
scientists, philosophers, politicians, or opinion leaders, but from «John and 
Jane Doe»? We can assert without going too far out on a limb that whilst the 
idea of «crisis» is the subject of academic debate, it is still infinitely fuzzier 
in its common sense acceptation. For the ordinary citizen, it is as much 
economic as it is social, environmental, moral, civilizational, and so on. The 
abundance of meanings around the concern that is labelled the «crisis issue» 
is such that the expression could be termed a «floating signifier», to borrow 
from the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss’s concept (1950). There is 
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nothing pejorative about this term. It merely highlights the following fact: the 
effectiveness of a notion, that is to say, its success in a culture, is at least partly 
connected to the multiplicity of its possible uses or, to state it differently, to the 
intrinsic semantic vacuum that characterizes it. Indeed, in common parlance, 
the notion of crisis, even if it is qualified as an economic one, is used to refer to 
much more than a problem of resource distribution or structural contradictions 
in the capitalistic system. In using it, people speak of unbridled liberalism, 
individualism, loss of landmarks, materials, etc.
The general thesis of this article is precisely that «crisis» terminology is a 
cultural resource (Illouz, 2008) that serves as a pressure valve for expressing 
the various worries that are specific to individualistic liberal-democratic 
societies (Ehrenberg, 2010). This discourse makes it possible to visualize and 
to retranslate certain (real or assumed) difficulties of living together into the 
liberal vocabulary of autonomy, individual responsibility, and the common 
good.
The sociological dissection of the ways the notion of «crisis» is used 
enables one to reveal a «grammar of change» amongst its users, i.e., a more or 
less shared representation of «what is wrong» with society, of the «causes of 
the uneasiness» or «crises» that it experiences, but also of the real or illusionary 
possibilities for transforming society in a more or less well-thought-out and 
organized manner. This prompts us to challenge our indigenous conceptions of 
«the good life» and «living together in the world».
The article is organized as follows: first, I shall present my methodological 
approach, along with a discussion of the positions that the specific corpus led 
me to take. Second, I shall present this «grammar of change.» Thirdly, I shall 
focus on a particularly interesting question, namely, upon whom, depending 
on the individual, does responsibility for resolving the crisis lie? One line of 
tension is of particular interest in this regard, namely, the one that concerns 
the place of politics and political action (in these representations of common 
meanings) as a potential agent of change in society. Finally, in the fourth and 
last part we shall see what these grammars of change borrow from the liberal 
atmosphere that has swept through our society at the same time as they take 
this (neo-)liberalism as a main target of criticism.
2. Methodology and survey material
This demonstration is based on the results of a recent Internet survey. 
The questionnaire comprised some 150 questions concerning the respondents’ 
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values, representations, and behaviours primarily in the fields of the economy, 
ecology, political involvement, involvement in associations, multiculturality, 
self-development, and spirituality.
Specifying the population segment targeted and the way the data were 
collected is indispensable so as to avoid misunderstandings about the scope 
of the findings presented here. The survey effectively targeted mostly 
Belgian individuals who could be assumed to be socialized with regard to 
(even interested in) a discourse of social change. The survey was effectively 
publicized via channels (magazines, newsletters, associations and agencies, 
etc.) likely to reach people involved in sustainable development, forms of 
alternative economies, or even think-tanks about the future of the world, 
ecology, and so on. The questionnaire could be consulted on the Internet 
during the first few months of 2012. In all, 2741 respondents filled out the 
questionnaire validly.
However, the large sample size must not lead us astray: the survey cannot 
claim to have any «representativity» (in the statistical sense of the term). 
The sample was not constructed by means of a random procedure for the 
simple reason that the target group, i.e., people already sensitized to issues of 
social change, is not identified. No database making it possible to construct 
a random sample (or to correct for bias in the sample) for such a segment 
exists. Consequently, given the way the survey was conducted (open access 
on the Internet), it is inevitably subject to the well-known problem of self-
selection bias, since the respondents themselves chose to be part of the sample 
by answering the questionnaire (see Frippiat & Marquis, 2010). There is no 
certainty that these respondents are representative of the individuals who did 
not take part because they either did not have access to the survey or did not 
want to answer the questions.
While keeping this point in mind, we must nevertheless guard against 
embracing a «fetishist» vision of statistical representativity. Like Olivier Martin 
(2009), I propose here to look at the issue from the opposite angle: while 
this survey cannot claim to speak for a population that is not defined, it is 
nevertheless an exploratory study that makes it possible to approach such a 
population for the first time. My wager is that it reveals more clearly than in 
other groups the symbolic logics that have the status of an ideal type as defined 
by Weber. Consequently, to be correct, I shall thus take care to talk about 
«proportion of the sample» rather than «proportion of a population» that cannot 
be defined by any other means.
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Table 1 gives a better idea of the sample’s distribution with regard to 
some conventional socio-demographic variables. Notice the large proportion 
of women and of people having completed higher education (more than twelve 
years of schooling), as well as the small proportion of people under 30.
Table 1. Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample
Variable No. of valid respondents Percentage of total
Gender
Female 1891 69.0
Male 849 31.0
Total 2740 100
Age bracket
Under 30 393 14.3
30-49 years 1148 41.9
50+ 1199 43.8
Total 2740 100
Net monthly income
0-1000 EUR 609 22.2
1001-2000 EUR 1429 52.2
2001 EUR or more 1220 44.5
Total 2738 100
Highest completed level of instruction
9 years or less 122 4.5
12 years 473 17.3
more than 12 years 2137 78.3
Total 2732 100
Place of residence
Brussels 751 28.1
Wallonia 1525 57.0
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Variable No. of valid respondents Percentage of total
Flanders 88 3.3
Out of Belgium (mainly 
France)
311 11.6
Total 2675 100
The overwhelming majority of the respondents presented themselves as 
being better informed, more aware of, and more concerned about societal 
problems. What is more, many of the subjects declared that they were engaged 
in «work on themselves»: indeed, close to 90% agreed with the idea that they had 
embarked on a path of «personal development». The majority also agreed with 
the statement that they were sensitive to «the spiritual dimension of existence» 
(76.1%), working on upgrading their «human potential» (82.2%), working on 
their relationship with their own body (68.8%), engaged in therapy (68.3%), or 
even engaged in work on thinking about the «feminine and masculine values 
that inhabit them» (75.4%). Finally, the majority of the respondents tended to 
think of themselves as different from others, better informed and more active 
than the average citizen, and even had no qualms asserting that they did not see 
eye to eye with the population at large.
3. Grammar of change
The term «grammar» is borrowed from the philosophy of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (2004). A grammar structures what the philosopher calls «a 
language-game». This can be understood to be a set of terms that a group of 
individuals belonging to one culture mobilizes often spontaneously to give 
meaning to the surrounding world. The study of these language-games thus 
enables us to grasp our cultural and socially situated «forms of life». The 
idea of a «language-game» is to show indeed that one cannot understand an 
utterance or a way of representing the world if one is not aware of the social 
environment in which it takes place. It is definitely not a matter of determining 
whether individuals are right or wrong, but of understanding how they use 
cultural resources and discourse to fashion the world in which they live, and 
to determine the opportuneness of an action. To do this, Wittgenstein said, one 
must study the meanings of words as one would an engine, that it to say, when 
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it is running. In our case, that means perceiving our respondents’ reactions to 
various propositions about the state of the world.
3.1. The idea of crisis and the causes of the general uneasiness
In the grammars glimpsed in our respondents’ answers, the idea that we 
are living in a society in crisis is definitely the most widespread idea, as is 
shown by the massive agreement with the deliberately fuzzy proposition «We 
are heading for disaster if we continue to live like this» (only 7.6% of the 
individuals said that they rather disagreed or disagreed completely with this 
statement). 
«We are heading for disaster if we continue to live like this»
 Number Percent Running total of percentages
Valid responses Disagree com-
pletely
10 0.4 0.4
Rather dis-
agree
37 1.3 1.7
Neutral 160 5.8 7.6
Rather agree 677 24.7 32.3
Agree com-
pletely
1857 67.7 100.0
Total 2741 100.0  
The degree of agreement with this proposition shows well the dominance 
of the common representation according to which we are at an unprecedented 
turning point in our history. It is nevertheless interesting to observe that, 
beyond this plebiscite, the respondents show themselves to be much more 
divided when they had to answer more specific questions about the nature of 
this crisis. Here, two aspects bear mentioning:
The first one can be expressed as follows: Is it possible to change the 
current system «from inside» by adding new principles to those that already 
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exist, or is the only solution that of revolutionizing the current system’s 
fundamentals to rebuild the system on new foundations? More specifically, 
is it possible to reconcile a capitalistic economy’s interests and ecological 
needs? Our respondents’ answers to this question are extraordinarily varied, to 
the point where this variable has the largest standard deviation in the battery 
of questions: 44.3% of the respondents disagreed with the idea, 17.5% were 
indifferent to it, and 39.2% supported it. Other variables questioning the 
possibility of changing the current system without a fundamental overhaul 
yielded identical distributions. The apparent agreement about the need for 
change thus must not mask the different ways that individuals envision the 
magnitude of said change.
«It is possible to reconcile the interests of a capitalistic economy  
and ecological needs»
 Number Percentage Running total of percentages
Valid 
responses
Disagree completely 528 19.3 19.3
Rather disagree 687 25.1 44.3
Indifferent 480 17.5 61.8
Rather agree 640 23.3 85.2
Agree completely 406 14.8 100.0
Total 2741 100.0  
The second aspect completes the first one. Beyond the general feeling 
of «crisis», the respondents’ opinions as to the main causes of the situation 
that we are in were more divided. When they were asked to rank the threats 
that loomed over our world by order of importance (with 1 being the most 
important and 7 the least important), there was a general plebiscite for the 
predominance of the economic system as the leading threat. Second (and well 
behind the first one) came environmental destruction, followed – with the same 
interval – by the item concerning the increasing scarcity of resources available 
for humankind. The idea of a loss of meaning was in the middle, just after the 
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problems linked to resource allocation, whilst the lack of personal development 
was seen as the least threatening item.
The main threats facing our world are...
 Mean Standard deviation
The predominance of the economic system 2.6746 1.68459
Destruction of the environment 3.0467 1.66414
Overpopulation, causing global famine, and 
the problem of access to drinking water
3,4677 1.73357
The loss of meaning and the ambient mate-
rialism
3.5108 1.89322
Violence generated by conflicts and terror-
ism
4.2999 1.75419
Poverty in rich countries 5.3491 1.50071
Absence of personal development in the 
population
5.6512 1.62985
N valid responses  2741  
3.2. Is there still room for utopia?
Exploring the grammars of change also entails looking at the two semantic 
dimensions of practical or indigenous representations of utopia as eutopia, 
i.e., «the good place», «the ideal society», and u-topia, «the place that does 
not exist», «the society that is impossible to achieve». Before dwelling on this 
point, a quick flash-back is required. For many intellectuals, the 20th century 
was marked by three hiatuses in the production of utopias in the Western world, 
to the point where catastrophe was seen as «the bad conscience of modernity» 
(Foessel, 2012 a: 666). 
First, the completion of the separation between Church and State, which 
began with the philosophy of the Enlightenment and was confirmed in France 
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by the Briant Act of 1905, confined belief in Heaven to the private sphere 
once and for all (Gauchet, 1985) and gave way to the celebration of Reason, 
which was supposed to enable man to free himself from the shackles of his 
«minority status» (Kant, 1792, Was ist Auflkärung?). The utopia of a «beyond» 
was replaced by a utopia made possible solely by the development of human 
abilities.
The second break corresponds to the fall of the «secular ideologies (or 
religions)» of Nazism and Marxism, each of which encapsulated hope for a 
new world accessible here below. Two notable consequences of this fall were 
discussed at length. First was the blow that the discovery of the atrocities that 
Hitler’s and Stalin’s regimes committed – rationally – struck the rationalist 
programme initiated by the Enlightenment (Dumont, 1976; de Lara, 2008). 
Second, the triumph of liberalism, crystallized by the end of the Cold War and 
fall of the Berlin Wall, was freed of the threatening alternative of Communism 
(De Munck, 1999). So, the world gradually became more and more disenchanted 
as «ideologies» – as Destutt de Tracy put it – disappeared. It would appear that 
the only thing remaining was a (neo-)liberal system that could destroy or take 
on board the criticism levelled at it (Boltanski & Chiapello, 1999) and the 
stated utopia of which – actually a dystopia – was that of a Darwinian world 
in which collective structures had disappeared, everyone struggled against 
everyone, and exploitation knew no bounds (Bourdieu, 1998). 
The third break consists of the gradual awareness of what could be 
called «the world’s finiteness», in which it is understood that humankind 
henceforward has the power to destroy itself, as we have been led to believe by 
the development of weapons of mass destruction (see Anders, 2008), industrial 
and technological disasters (such as the Chernobyl accident – see Beck, 2001), 
and of course the many facets of the environmental problem (depletion of 
resources, pollution of the biosphere, destruction of the ozone layer, increase 
in the human population, etc.).1 
What place can be given to utopias in this context? If we read what 
philosophers and sociologists have to say, three attitudes are currently 
competing on the field. The first one is that of cynicism. As revealed by 
Sloterdijk (1987) and Castoriadis (1975), it is the attitude espoused by those 
who, no longer believing in anything, not even in the possibility of progress 
through human reason, give up investing in change to adapt to the current 
1. As attested by, for example, the report The limits to growth, published by the Club of Rome 
think-tank in 1972, several aspects of which reactivate some neo-Malthusian arguments (for 
more on this doctrine’s resurgence, see Lemaître, 2009).
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world, whilst gleaning as much personal advantage as they can as long as 
such possibilities are given them. The second attitude allegedly results from 
the transition from a social utopia (such as presented by More or Rabelais) to 
a «techno-utopia» (Musso, 2010). In this case, utopia is torn from the socio-
political field to be nurtured by a scientism that prophesises that humankind’s 
well-known problems will be solved by the development of knowledge 
(«technoprophets»). The third attitude is that of «catastrophism» – also a 
dystopia – foreseeing a bleak future for humankind that is unable to understand 
and manage itself. 
The opposition between «technoprophetism» and (biological or economic) 
«catastrophism» is highly visible in many discussions today. Although they 
share the reference to a current insufficient state (and to the crisis vocabulary), 
the announcement of a massive (imminent or more remote) change along with 
strong criticism of the fatal argument of necessity (which basically says, «If 
you’d been in our shoes, you wouldn’t have done it differently» (Stengers, 
2009)) is used by the leaders in place to justify all forms of status quo; the 
holders of each attitude accuse each other of unawareness and the inability 
to argue their case. Catastrophism puts itself forward as the emblem of a new 
lucidity, whereas its critics see in it only a form of conservatism that one must 
continue to counter by the search for progress that began in the Enlightenment. 
Some philosophers (inter alia Lecourt, 2003) believed that they could sum up 
this tension in the opposition between a specific form of humanism (confidence 
in human beings’ abilities to think up new solutions, especially technical ones), 
which sees salvation in investing in research and development in particular 
and, more generally, in an «appeal to intelligence», on the one hand, and an 
unavowed form of anti-humanist asceticism (Gauchet, 1990), on the other 
hand, with catastrophism imagining humankind’s self-limitation, even denial, 
of what it currently is as a necessity, whether humans impose this on themselves 
voluntarily («best-case scenario») or it occurs uncontrollably.
The corpus of material at our disposal enables us to discuss the picture 
outlined above to show that the grammar of change that was revealed by 
our respondents actually corresponds to none of the three typical attitudes 
(cynicism, techno-utopia, and catastrophism) described above.
3.2.1. Optimist
First of all, the concern for a world in crisis expressed by the respondents 
and crystallized in the idea that «we are heading for disaster if we continue to 
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live like this» was generally accompanied by a form of enchanted optimism 
foreign to both the cynical attitude and the catastrophist perspective. The 
majority of the respondents believe in the possibility of an accessible 
«change for the better» for the world, humankind, and each of its members 
and stated that they could already see the seeds of such change. So, only 
16.4% of the respondents stated that they did not agree with the idea that 
«something good will ultimately come out of the current context of crisis», 
whereas close to 50% said that they saw initiatives that showed that we were 
«on the right track».
«I think that something good will ultimately come out of the current  
crisis context»
 Number Percent Running total of percentages
Valid 
responses
Disagree com-
pletely
98 3.6 3.6
Rather disagree 351 12.8 16.4
Indifferent 823 30.0 46.4
Rather agree 1166 42.5 88.9
Agree completely 303 11.1 100.0
Total 2741 100.0  
3.2.2. The paths of change
How do these individuals imagine the ways that this change, which was 
recognised as necessary by all, and possible by the majority, come about? The 
following table gives the respondents’ rankings of the most probable paths of 
change (1 being the most probable and 8 the least probable).
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The most probable paths of change are…
 Mean Standard deviation
a change in the way the economy works 2.9792 1.98827
community action and new social move-
ments
3.1609 1.65115
actions taken individually by each of us 
as citizens/consumers
3.4593 1.74263
inner work by a large number of people 4.0595 2.21057
the decisions taken by political entities 4.8070 2.19363
a larger place taken by women 5.2149 1.79358
scientific and technological progress 5.5418 1.93550
actions taken by other entities that do not 
depend on people
6.7775 1.83640
N valid responses  2741  
Several elements are worthwhile singling out for attention. First of all, a 
change in the way the economy works clearly stands out at the top of the ranking, 
just as the threat that the predominance of this system represented did in the 
previous ranking. The current context of economic crisis in which the world 
has been enmeshed since 2008 and the discourse that this generates definitely 
have weight in this plebiscite. Secondly, the «techno-utopia» mentioned above 
does not seem to strike a chord with the respondents, since scientific and 
technological progress was ranked next to last (mean ranking of 5.54 out of 8). 
Thirdly, the fifth place given to «decisions taken by political entities» (4.8/8) 
is surprising. Not only is this item in the bottom half of the table, but it is also 
preceded by three singular items, namely, community action, individual action, 
and inner work by a large number of people. So, whilst the absence of personal 
development was not perceived as threatening the world’s future, working on 
oneself and individual and collective action are seen as having the ability to 
produce change well beyond the credibility that politicians can enjoy. This line 
of tension appears to be particularly interesting. That is why I propose to dwell 
upon it here and shall try to draw some conclusions from its examination.
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4. Who will be the hoped-for agent of change?
For many commentators and essayists who have examined the current 
situation (see, for example, Lordon’s writings), the main question still up in the 
air is whether the crisis context will be a factor of paralysis in the struggle and a 
vector of divestment from the common weal by individuals too busy saving the 
little that they can scrounge for themselves (in this sense, a door opening onto a 
new «state of nature», one of war on everybody), or, on the contrary, will blaze a 
trail to action and lead to catastrophe in its etymological meaning of revolution. 
Here it is once again interesting to examine the grammars of change to see how 
our respondents assign responsibility for the change(s) to come.
4.1. Disavowal of politicians
Our respondents’ rapports with «politics» in general are interesting to 
analyse, for they are highly revealing.2 The respondents were massively 
interested in local and global political issues (close to 80% of them agreed with 
this proposition). Yet, the lack of trust in «politics in general» is impressive. 
As the following table shows, only 6.1% of the respondents stated that they 
had faith in politics.
«Generally speaking, I have faith in politics»
 Number Percent Running total  of percentages
Valid 
responses
Disagree completely 1275 46.5 46.5
Rather disagree 868 31.7 78.2
Indifferent 432 15.8 93.9
Rather agree 158 5.8 99.7
Agree completely 8 0.3 100.0
Total 2741 100.0  
2. There are obviously statistically significant differences between the positions of the 16% who are 
political activists and the remaining 84% of the sample. Unfortunately, we do not have room here to 
expound upon all aspects of this rich corpus and thus must treat these two subsamples together.
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This mistrust inevitably affects the belief in the possibility of changing 
things through political activism, to which only 43% of our respondents 
adhered. What is more, the readability and relevance of the system’s categories 
were also challenged, for close to 40% of our respondents said that they felt 
that they belonged neither to the right nor the left, and more than 50% asserted 
that they considered the notions of right and left to be obsolete. However, the 
fact that politicians were considered overall to be untrustworthy and incapable 
(for example, 68% of the respondents thought that government could no 
longer regulate the economy) did not prevent the respondents from continuing 
massively to make many demands of their politicians: government should 
take steps to regulate financial transactions and businesses better, to control 
resources, to improve the educational system, and so on.
This disavowal of politics seems to be accompanied by the promotion of 
means of action, to wit, community action and «new social movements» on 
the one hand and individual actions (including work on oneself and personal 
development) on the other hand, that could be called apolitical, to the extent 
that their value comes precisely from the fact that they do not use the pathways 
of political action.
4.2. Community action and new social movements
It is easy to pick out from the respondents’ positions the idea that the 
«Archimedes point» at which it becomes possible to produce change is 
«outside the system» – and, from their standpoint, politics seems to be part 
of the system. The respondents readily see themselves as members of a «new 
generation» and have the feeling of «belonging to it», of being «where the 
action is». They actually think of themselves as the linchpins of the change to 
come. So, 77% of them concurred with the idea that their activities (outside 
their work) participated in building a better world. The social movement that 
they envisioned would thus operate outside conventional institutionalized 
pathways (hence the frequent use of the adjective «alternative») and according 
to the model of contagion or capillarity up until an overall tipping point was 
reached (see the metaphor of the last drop). As the following table shows, close 
to 80% of the respondents believed that a minority of individuals could change 
things on its own.
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«A minority that thinks differently can make things change»
 Number Percent Running total of percentages
Valid 
responses
Disagree completely 47 1.7 1.7
Rather disagree 218 8.0 9.7
Indifferent 357 13.0 22.7
Rather agree 1376 50.2 72.9
Agree completely 743 27.1 100.0
Total 2741 100,0  
4.3. Working on oneself
Even more astonishing is the number of respondents who seem to engage 
in individual action, self-help, personal development, or working on oneself 
as a factor of social change. Faith in the minority is backed up by faith in 
the individual and her/his abilities. For the needs of this article, personal 
development can be defined as a logical scheme (of meaning and action) 
whereby the individual, acting alone or in a group, can work on her/himself 
in order to mobilize until then unexplored «inner resources» for the purpose 
of improving certain aspects of her/his life and the world in which s/he lives.3 
Whilst personal development may have a bad reputation in certain social strata, 
it was not at all perceived as something negative in this sample: only 10% of 
the respondents agreed with the proposition «personal development is above 
all the action of individuals who are concerned about themselves only», while 
77% rejected it (and 13% said that they were «Indifferent»). On the contrary, 
personal development enjoyed the «anti-establishment» connotation in which 
it is often wrapped. Why is self-improvement seen as having the virtue to 
change the world? The respondents gave several reasons (for example, 91.2% 
feel that «our future will hinge on the quality of human relations»), but they 
can be subsumed under the banners of «practical anthropology» and «practical 
3. For a more extensive discussion of how it is possible to define «personal development» in 
social science, see Marquis (2012).
nicolas marquis  Utopia in a liberal world facing crisis. Analysis of the new «grammars of change»      103
cosmology» (Marquis, 2012) that are revealed by the respondents’ grammars. 
These widespread symbolic formations can be understood as ways of conceiving 
human beings and the world to make them accessible to action. For most of 
our respondents, human beings were «basically good» (only 27.4% disagreed 
with this proposition), but «society is what warps certain human beings» (only 
15% disagreed with this proposition). In this representation of the world, 
the respondents reactivated a very common old scheme of thinking that pits 
the «good savage» against the «bad product of civilisation». The sociologist 
Claudine Herzlich had already identified this scheme in 1969 in the general 
discourse surrounding health and illness: «society», in its common acception, 
is yet another floating signifier that is used to explain many problems. It is on 
the side of the artificial that contaminates us, whereas our inner being is the 
reservoir of what is natural and pure. So, it is interesting to observe that the 
majority of our respondents did not feel that the social environments in which 
they moved respected their inner beings.
«I have the impression of living in a social environment that respects  
my deepest inner being»
 Number Percent Running total of percentages
Valid 
responses
Disagree completely 434 15.8 15.8
Rather disagree 1019 37.2 53.0
Indifferent 602 22.0 75.0
Rather agree 545 19.9 94.9
Agree completely 141 5.1 100.0
Total 2741 100,0  
Two consequences of this symbolic representation should be noted. 
First, the respondents assert a more monistic approach against the naturalistic 
ontology that separates man from nature (Descola, 2005): 95.2% shared the 
view that «Earth is a huge organism with which we must live harmoniously», 
and 92.8% agreed with the proposition «The human being is part of nature 
and must not try to control it». There, too, «society» is what allegedly perverts 
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human beings by cutting them off from a symbiotic relationship with the 
environment that it is imperative to restore. 
The second consequence is even more interesting. In the respondents’ 
grammar it is thus meaningful to work on oneself (on one’s identity, inner 
being, values, true relationship with one’s body or others, etc.) to «(re)find 
oneself», even – and even more so – if this work entails distancing oneself 
from «society», from «the system». As we have seen, a large proportion of 
the respondents in this sample announced that they were effectively engaged 
in personal development, in upgrading their human potential, etc. From their 
point of view, that is not a choice that we are free to make. «Developing 
oneself» is rather an obligation, as the following table shows.
«Generally speaking, all human beings should try to develop themselves 
throughout their lives»
 Number Percent Running total of percentages
Valid 
responses
Disagree completely 11 0.4 0.4
Rather disagree 15 0.5 0.9
Indifferent 175 6.4 7.3
Rather agree 885 32.3 39.6
Agree completely 1655 60.4 100.0
Total 2741 100.0  
This obligation is not just a matter of self-respect; it is also a matter of 
living in society. For these respondents, speaking of «the social responsibility 
of personal development or of working on oneself» is not an oxymoron. 
Indeed, it is possible to detect in this practical anthropology an equation 
between personal development and social development, as shown by the 
very broad support for the cliché4 according to which «being oneself already 
changes things».
4. There is nothing pejorative about this term. It is to be understood simply as an expression able 
to reflect a certain spirit of the times.
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«Being oneself already changes things»
 Number Percentage Running total  of percentages
Valid 
responses
Disagree com-
pletely
33 1.2 1.2
Rather disagree 111 4.0 5.3
Indifferent 463 16.9 22.1
Rather agree 1075 39.2 61.4
Agree completely 1059 38.6 100.0
Total 2741 100.0  
5.  The elective affinities between personal development and the decline  
of politics
Is there a connection between the decline of politics and politicians’ 
credibility and (over)investment in the individual’s or group’s abilities 
seen in this grammar of change? That is what we shall analyse now. There 
are two complementary ways of interpreting the link between these two 
representations. The first one has to do with the structure of society (this time 
in the sociological sense of the term), and the second one has to do with our 
world’s moral environment.
5.1. How to act in a complex world?
According to this first interpretation, we must look for the reason for this 
(new) way of envisioning social change in the hypercomplexity of modern 
society, in which the «causal chains» (to use Georg Simmel’s expression) 
have become so long that it is often very difficult for us to understand who 
is responsible for what happens to us. So, a personnel manager may fire 
employees because s/he must meet profitability targets set on another continent 
to please a myriad of unknown, invisible shareholders (who might even include 
the fired employees!). So, we are often subject to systemic effects that no one 
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truly controls (even though, of course, some have infinitely more possibilities 
than others to gain from them rather than suffering their consequences (see 
Boltanski, 2009)). Our respondents seem to share this feeling of an opaque 
society in which we no longer know very well where to act and whom to 
pressure to effect changes. The disparity between the responses to the following 
two assertions, which were presented one after the other in the questionnaire, 
is striking: 
 «I want to act on society»
«I have the impression of 
having a hold on the world as 
it currently exists»
 Number Percent
Running 
total of 
percentage
Number Percent
Running 
total of 
percentage
Valid 
respon-
ses
Disagree 
completely
40 1.5 1.5 348 12.7 12.7
Rather disa-
gree
146 5.3 6.8 869 31.7 44.4
Indifferent 661 24.1 30.9 847 30.9 75.3
Rather agree 1264 46.1 77.0 540 19.7 95.0
Agree com-
pletely
630 23.0 100.0 137 5.0 100.0
Total 2741 100.0  2741 100.0  
Whereas close to 70% of the respondents stated that they wanted to act 
on society, only 25% had the impression that they had a hold on the world 
as it is today. How do they reconcile this feeling of powerlessness with their 
faith in the possibility of a social change in which they might play a part? The 
answer seems obvious: by working on what is workable, that is to say, oneself 
to start off with, and possibly on our near and dear. From this point of view, 
believing in the virtue of personal development or of the action of small groups 
to produce social change turns out to be the logical, rational, and sensible 
consequence of the feeling of powerlessness that is generated by society’s 
opaqueness. Similarly, their distrust of politics and politicians seems above 
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all to mark disbelief as to the possibility of a conventional political plan being 
able to change a society on which it, too, ultimately has few holds. 
Even though this answer appears to be obvious, understandable, and rational 
once it is put back into the context of complex societies, it has nonetheless upset 
many (French-speaking) sociologists for years. For such sociologists, there is 
a clear link between divestment from politics and overinvestment in work on 
oneself. The interesting writings on this subject include R. Castel’s (1981) La 
gestion des risques. Thirty years ago this author was already wondering about 
the consequences of the following: 
[...] when economic, social, and political options are beyond the subject’s 
control, the psychological is endowed with a form of reality that is autonomised, 
if not autonomous. We are now facing a subjectivity that is all the more “free” 
as it manages only issues of minor importance. As social life has already 
divested, in many sectors, from options that go beyond staging the personal 
economy, the establishment of a psychologically saturated sociability creates 
the last theatre in which a relational culture unfolds, a culture that in such a 
case can have no other purpose than to reproduce itself. (Castel, 1981: 191 
[italics added]). This thesis is definitely stimulating, but must be updated.
5.2. A common foundation: the liberal understanding of the world
I believe that this first interpretation must be backed up by a second one, 
an interpretation that adds the moral context (in Durkheim’s sense of the word, 
i.e., shared mores) in which we live. We can posit that there is a much deeper 
elective affinity between the discourse around personal development and the 
grammar of change that is revealed by our respondents’ remarks.
I should like to defend here the idea that if these sensitivities seem to a 
certain extent to go hand in hand, it is because they are rooted in the same 
philosophical tradition, that of liberalism.5 This may seem paradoxical, 
given that «liberalism» (once again a hollow signifier) is indeed a clear 
adversary, and claimed as such, of many of the individuals in the survey. Yet 
the grammars of change presented here support Ehrenberg’s (2010) thesis, 
according to which the moral environment in which we live is paralysed with 
liberal representations from political philosophy (Locke, inter alia) at times, 
5. Unfortunately, we do not have space here to go into the difference between economic and 
political liberalism, or even the difference between the American and French takes on 
liberalism.
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from the representation of society as a market (Smith, inter alia) at other times, 
or from doctrines celebrating the individual in action (Calvin’s puritanism, 
Emerson’s American transcendentalism, A. Maslow’s humanist psychology, 
the currently popular currents that stress the power of the mind over ourselves 
and the world in general, such as psycho-cybernetics and positive psychology, 
and many other doctrines)6 at still other times. All of these representations have 
moulded our ways of representing ourselves and of claiming certain qualities.
Our moral environment can be called liberal because in it a certain type 
of behaviour is expected of individuals, that of autonomy. Ehrenberg (2010) 
describes our societies in a stimulating way as being societies of «autonomy 
as a condition», in which autonomous behaviour is no longer a state that one 
strives for (as was the case during the three decades of post-war prosperity), 
but a standard, a desirable social expectation, a presumed ability of each 
individual that the individual is asked to activate in a series of circumstances. 
The individual must thus be responsible for her/himself; otherwise s/he is liable 
to more or less formalised social sanctions. The social sciences have for years 
concerned themselves with the consequences of these new representations and 
practices in the area of the redistribution of wealth by the State. So, several 
sociologists have produced critiques of what today goes by the name of the 
«active social Welfare State», in which aid is no longer unconditional but 
contingent on the recipient’s being able to prove her/his autonomous behaviour 
aimed at taking control of her/his life (see, for example, Vielle et al., 2005).
It is striking to see how much sociologists’ often worried and critical 
views on this liberal moral environment and its hypothetical consequences 
differ from the way that our respondents readily endorse the structure of this 
discourse to apply it to other swatches of their lives (but, it is true, where the 
leitmotif of autonomy and individual responsibility does not take the form 
of a requirement imposed by others, as is the case of social aid in the age of 
the active social Welfare State). Indigenous representations of social change 
seem to be one of these swatches. They attest to the way that people think 
of the possibility for human beings to produce their own fates in the context 
of societies of «autonomy as a condition». Whether this is presented in an 
esoteric or non-esoteric, psychologising or non-psychologising vocabulary, 
the autonomous individual is considered in the grammars of change dissected 
here to be the basic atom of action (which can become collective by spreading 
from relation to relation). Of course, this is not a scientific hypothesis put 
forward by the respondents, but a moral proposition that refers to the practical 
6. See Ehrenberg (2010) and Marquis (2012) for a presentation of these connections.
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anthropology and cosmology described earlier. From their points of view, the 
role of the politician who has failed in his mission of staving off a world in 
crisis and is now part of the «system» from which we must escape to have 
hopes of a change coming about, is limited to that of setting up the conditions 
of this individual action7 based on each person’s inner resources, to the extent 
that this individual action seems to be the only believable, even possible, way 
out.
But how is it possible not to see that in these grammars, the most probable, 
the most effective agent of change is ultimately taking individual responsibility, 
for which indeed our respondents are clamouring? And that each of us can and 
must give proof of this by taking charge of ourselves for our own benefit as well 
as for the common good?8 How can we overlook the fact that the respondents 
seem to make the advent of a new world a matter of individual efforts and of 
aggregated personal determination? How, consequently, can we fail to grasp 
the proximity between the conventional representation of the market (based 
on autonomous individuals who own their liberty and act according to their 
consciences) and the idea that social change will result from the aggregation 
of individual changes (or those made by small groups) in our representations 
and mentalities?9 Would not the world be better if it finally returned to a 
society of fundamentally good and responsible, free individuals, which would 
end up in getting each of us to work upon ourselves? Autonomy, individual 
responsibility, effectiveness, personal effort, freedom, mentality (and also the 
7. This is what the vocabulary of «empowerment» expresses. To illustrate this, we can point 
out that 91.2% of the respondents agreed with the idea that «The State should put subjects 
such as better self-understanding and relations with others on the same footing as academic 
knowledge and training». This can be heard as a distant echo of the liberal philosopher 
Benjamin Constant’s maxim celebrating the «negative freedom» of the Moderns: «Let them 
[government] confine themselves to being just. We shall assume the responsibility of being 
happy for ourselves» (1819). It is thus important to see that the political sphere has not been 
totally abandoned by the respondents. Rather, it remains an important regulatory factor (and 
they continue to make many demands of it and to criticise it for its assumed inability to fulfil 
these missions). What they do seem to have lost faith in, however, is the political sphere’s 
ability to back a plan of substance for society (or a utopia).
8. Moreover, this exact same idea triggers reams of reactions when it is applied in the world 
of business, or in the «active social Welfare State», where individuals are gauged by their 
ability to take charge of themselves. Indeed, it is interesting to note that only 13.9% of the 
respondents to this survey stated that they did not agree with the proposition «I think that 
when it comes to all the people in difficulty, the community should help first those who are 
doing their utmost to get by». 
9. This vision is not at all new; a typical formulation of it can be found in the New Age current 
(Garnoussi, 2007).
 110 clr ˙ doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.6035/clr.2014.12.5 ˙ issn 1697-7750 · vol. xii \ 2014, pp. 87-112
power to think), and so on: this is indeed the vocabulary of liberalism, and it 
is mobilised in manifestations of liberalism that we perceive as desirable at 
certain times and detestable at other times.
6. Conclusions
These grammars attest to ways of expressing worries and hopes that are 
specific to individualistic societies (for which the individual is the supreme 
value10). However, isn’t the «ambient individualism» precisely what is 
incriminated in the grammars present in lay discourse (and in certain scientific 
writings) as the cause of the crisis? According to Ehrenberg (2010), there is 
nothing paradoxical in that. In comparing the United States and France he 
managed to advance the hypothesis that criticising individualistic societies, that 
the fear of the possibility of living together’s melting away, is consubstantial 
with such societies’ functioning. Becoming aware of this does not by any 
means disqualify this criticism any more than it justifies it.
Recognising that the grammars of change are situated in a liberal moral 
context makes it possible, however, to shed a different light on the issue of 
depoliticisation. This term must not be understood as qualifying a withdrawal 
from action, but rather as disqualifying certain forms of action, mainly collective 
ones. It also shows that whilst fingers are often pointed at «liberalism» in 
everyday parlance, we cannot detach ourselves so easily from its vocabulary 
and representations, which we have learnt to love over the centuries. So, even 
the formulation of indigenous utopias (as they are commonly understood) 
cannot do without them. On the contrary, it draws inspiration from there to 
imagine what both «the good life» and «living together in the world» should 
look like.
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